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Foreword 
In the year 2000, the leaders of 189 nations agreed to support global 
development objectives referred to as the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The MDGs are composed of eight fundamental goals which are 
further divided into 18 specific targets designed to serve as a blueprint 
and plan of action. The forward momentum generated by the adoption of 
the Millennium Declaration was then reinforced at the International 
Conference on Financing for Development, held in March 2002, which 
examined means of mobilizing resources for development efforts focusing 
on the goals and targets set forth in the Declaration. The World Summit 
on Sustainable Development that concluded in Johannesburg, South 
Africa, in September 2002 endorsed the MDGs as a basic pillar of the 
global sustainable development agenda. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been 
assigned the task of serving as the United Nations system’s “campaign 
manager” to track progress towards the achievement of the MDGs. In 
collaboration with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Institute for Applied Economic Research 
(IPEA), UNDP has worked with a team of specialists in the region to 
develop an innovative methodology for evaluating progress towards 
fulfilling the commitment to halve the proportion of the population living 
on less than one dollar a day by 2015. Using this methodology, the 
authors assessed 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries’ chances of 
reaching their poverty reduction targets and explored the impact of 
different policy instruments in reducing poverty. 
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As the authors point out, the findings give grounds for both 
concern and optimism. On the one hand, only seven countries would 
meet the poverty reduction target if their performance in terms of 
economic growth and inequality reduction were to continue along the 
same lines as it did in the 1990s. But, on the other hand, the changes 
required to meet the targets appear to be feasible. However, although the 
general lesson is that even very small reductions in inequality can have 
very large positive impacts on poverty, the region’s high levels of 
inequality have proved remarkably intractable thus far. 
The United Nations system is working to ensure systematic, 
sustained monitoring and review of progress towards the MDGs in terms 
of achievements, trends and shortfalls, based on authoritative, 
disaggregated data. Monitoring at the country level is expected to focus 
on regular MDG reports. These reports will be public documents 
intended for a broad audience that will include the general public, the 
media, experts and policy makers. The MDG reports will serve as 
catalysts for mobilizing public opinion and fostering a more vigorous 
national debate on how the MDGs apply to each country’s situation and 
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Executive summary 
• This report looks at the conditions under which 18 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries would individually be able 
to meet the extreme poverty reduction target established in the 
Millennium Declaration as one of the United Nations 
Millennium Development Targets. 
• The 18 countries considered in this report are Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
• The question that the report seeks to answer is whether or not 
each country will succeed in halving its extreme poverty rate as 
of 1999 (with respect both to an international poverty line which 
corresponds to the original dollar-a-day line and to a country-
specific poverty line) by the year 2015.1 
• Two scenarios are considered for each country: a “historical” 
one, which extrapolates the country's growth and inequality 
dynamics of the 1990s into the future; and an “alternative” one. 
The alternative scenario simulates movements that would take 
                                                          
1  The “Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration” (United Nations, 2001) stipulates that the target is to halve the proportion 
of extreme poverty which existed in 1990; 1999 has deliberately been chosen as the 
reference year, however, because it is the most recent point in time for which household 
data are available for a large number of countries in the region. 
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each country closer to a hypothetical “regional ideal” (referred 
to in the report as “Maxiland”), which is both richer and more 
egalitarian than any country in Latin America or the Caribbean 
actually is today.  
• Each of these scenarios is simulated by means of a simple 
procedure which generates counterfactual income distributions 
with higher means and lower inequality levels than those 
actually observed in 1999. The growth and inequality reduction 
parameters have been calibrated to generate all plausible 
(positive) combinations which yield the desired rates of poverty 
reduction. Steps were then taken to determine what it would 
take for each country to reach its target with respect to either 
line, along either path. For the alternative scenario, the analysis 
also covers a number of possible changes in employment levels, 
productivity, human capital stocks and transfers which would 
be statistically consistent with the simulated aggregate growth 
and inequality changes. 
• The report’s findings give grounds for both concern and 
(conditional) optimism. 
• The simulations based on the countries' historical performances 
are what gives rise to that concern. If the countries in the sample 
were to continue to perform as they did in the 1990s, only 7 of 
the 18 would meet their poverty reduction targets (with respect 
to the international poverty line) by 2015. These countries are 
Argentina (pre-crisis), Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Panama and Uruguay. 
• Another six countries would continue to reduce the incidence of 
extreme poverty, but at too slow a pace. These countries are 
Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and 
Nicaragua. The other five countries ―Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela― would actually see higher 
levels of extreme poverty due either to increases in inequality, 
decreases in per capita income, or both. 
• Simulations of the alternative scenario, on the other  hand, give 
cause for conditional optimism. Using this scenario, which was 
used to see how the countries’ income distributions would 
change if they were to succeed in becoming both progressively 
richer and less unequal, it was found that the changes required 
for every country to meet their poverty reduction targets appear 
to be quite feasible. 
Meeting the Millennium Poverty Reduction Targets in Latin America and the Caribbean  13 
 
• With respect to the international poverty line, this alternative 
scenario indicates that 16 countries could meet the target by 
combining average annual growth rates of GDP per capita of 3% 
or less with cumulative reductions in inequality of less than 4%. 
The two exceptions are Bolivia and El Salvador. 
• With respect to the country-specific extreme poverty lines, the 
alternative scenario indicates that only two countries ―Bolivia 
and Nicaragua― would require both an average annual growth 
rate of GDP per capita of more than 2% and a reduction in 
inequality of more than 5% to meet the target. 
• The findings therefore appear to indicate that even very small 
reductions in inequality can have very large positive impacts in 
terms of poverty reduction. For most of the countries that were 
considered, a one- or two-point reduction in the Gini coefficient 
would achieve the same reduction in the incidence of poverty as 
many years of positive economic growth would. A large part of 
the reason why recent poverty reduction efforts in Latin 
America and the Caribbean have yielded disappointing results 
is that the region's high levels of inequality have proved 
remarkably intractable. In the rare instances when countries 
have succeeded in reducing inequality, the pay-off in terms of 
poverty reduction has been large. 
• While there exists a statistical trade-off between the rates of 
economic growth and inequality reduction required to reach 
certain poverty targets, there is no evidence that growth and 
inequality reduction are economic substitutes for one another. 
On the contrary, the balance of the evidence suggests that the 
region's high inequality levels are a hindrance to more rapid 
growth. 
• The exercise covered in this report was based on the simulation 
of combinations of growth and inequality reductions which 
were statistically consistent with required rates of poverty 
reduction. Further research is needed on policy combinations 










At the Millennium Summit held in 2000, all 189 United Nations 
Member States ―and the international organizations to which their 
countries belong― pledged to meet a number of development targets  
that are set forth in the Millennium Declaration. These Millennium 
Development Targets give material expression to the expectations of the 
international community for social progress following a series of 
international conferences and summits that began in 1990 with the World 
Summit for Children.2 In the case of poverty reduction, the target consists 
in halving the proportion of the population that was living in extreme 
poverty as of 1990 by the year 2015. This target was originally defined 
with respect to an international poverty line of approximately one United 
States dollar (US$ 1.00) per person per day, at 1985 United States prices, 
which were then converted to national currencies using purchasing 
power parity (PPP) exchange rates.3 
                                                          
2  See United Nations (2000). 
3  The "dollar-a-day" per capita poverty line was first used by the World Bank (1990) to 
permit international comparisons of extreme poverty. The original line was measured in 
1985 international prices, converted to national currencies at PPP exchange rates. The 
World Bank (2001, p. 320) later updated the line to US$ 1.08 per capita, measured in 1993 
international prices. In this report, the United States consumer price index has been used 
to update that line from June 1993 to June 1999. As a result, the original 1985 US$ 1.00-a-
day per-person poverty line is now equivalent to US$ 1.24 at 1999 prices. This 
corresponds to a monthly per capita line of US$ 37.20, which is used for most countries 
in this report. The same set of consumer-price-based PPP exchange rates, dating to 1993, 
were used to convert the poverty line to national currencies. Further details are provided 
in the statistical appendix. 
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Poverty is a complex social and economic phenomenon, the 
dimensions and determinants of which are manifold. In this report, the 
analysis is abstracted somewhat from the multidimensionality and 
context-specificity of poverty ―without denying their importance― in 
order to focus on the universality of the need to reduce extreme poverty 
and deprivation. Poverty has, as Amartya Sen has put it, an “irreducible 
absolutist core” (Sen, 1983, p. 332). By focusing on the income dimension 
of deprivation and taking as its measure the incidence of extreme poverty, 
the researchers have sought to shed light on the economic policies and 
developments which would contribute to its eradication.4  
In particular, whenever poverty is defined as some aggregate of 
income shortfalls, it is always the case that its reduction requires some 
combination of economic growth and reduction in inequality. The 
purpose of this report is to illustrate the combinations of economic growth 
and inequality reductions which would enable each of 18 countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean to meet their individual Millennium 
poverty targets by reducing the incidence of extreme poverty by one half 
of what it was in 1999. A deliberate decision has been made to apply the 
spirit of the Millennium poverty targets (halving extreme poverty) to the 
rates prevailing at the most recent point in time (1999) for which 
household data are available for a large number of countries in the 
region.5 The 18 countries covered in the report are Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The analysis presented in this report proceeds as follows. The next 
section contains a brief discussion of some of the economic background 
for the analysis, as well as the data on which it draws. In section 2, the 
incidence of extreme poverty is calculated for each of these countries 
using two different poverty lines: the international poverty line of 
approximately one dollar per person per day, and an extreme poverty line 
which is calculated specifically for each country by ECLAC. A set of 
simulated counterfactual income distributions are then constructed for 
                                                          
4  While this report focuses on the income dimension of poverty, a number of other 
Millennium Development Goals were established specifically for the purpose of 
addressing complementary dimensions, including literacy, health, gender equality and 
freedom from malnutrition. Additionally, this analysis concentrates even more narrowly 
on the incidence of poverty. ECLAC (2002a) presents the other two common Foster, 
Greer & Thorbecke (1984) measures for all the countries discussed here. 
5  Because of this change, the simulations do not correspond exactly to the conditions set 
forth in the “Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration” (United Nations, 2001), which defines the target as being to halve the 
proportion of extreme poverty between 1990 and 2015. 
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each country. Each such distribution is designed so as to have exactly half 
of the country's original poverty rate, and each is derived from the actual 
1999 distribution by a combination of two simple operations: raising all 
incomes by an equal proportion (β) and reducing inequality by some 
other fixed proportion (α).  
Clearly, a given poverty target, such as half of the 1999 rate, can be 
reached through many different combinations of (distribution-neutral) 
economic growth rates (of β%) and reductions in inequality (of α%). This 
report therefore presents the complete set of (positive) growth and 
inequality-reduction combinations (α, β)-pairs which would generate the 
poverty reductions required to meet the Millennium target. We call these 
combinations the isopoverty sets or, when drawn on an (α, β)-space, 
isopoverty curves, and interpret them as the set of outcome combinations 
which would generate the poverty reductions desired by each national 
signatory to the Millennium Declaration.6  
Section 3 goes one step further and suggests an accounting identity 
which allows for a consideration of different ways in which the required 
rates of economic growth and inequality reduction can be generated on 
the basis of different combinations of changes in the occupation ratio, the 
stock of human capital available in the economy, its average productivity 
and public transfers. A summary and conclusions are presented in  











                                                          
6  Naturally, while each of these outcomes is statistically consistent with the desired rate of 
poverty reduction, the simulations provide no information about the behavioural 
consistency across economic agents. This issue involves policy questions which are 
substantially more complex. Nevertheless, while statistical consistency is not sufficient 
to ensure that each such combination is tenable, such consistency is necessary for 
meeting the target. 
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I.   Background and data 
After a more or less uniformly dismal decade in the 1980s, the 
1990s saw considerable diversity in growth and poverty-reduction 
experiences across Latin America and the Caribbean. While most 
countries recorded positive rates of growth in GDP per capita, thereby 
making up for some or all of the considerable losses incurred during the 
“debt-crisis decade” (the 1980s), these gains were generally modest. On 
average, Brazil's GDP per capita grew at 1.0% per annum during 1990-
1999. Over the same period and in the same terms, Mexico grew at 1.4%, 
Bolivia at 1.5%, Uruguay at 2.8% and Argentina at 3.3%. But there were 
outliers at both extremes: on the upside, the Chilean economy expanded 
at a remarkable 4.5% in per capita terms over this period. On the 
downside, Paraguay recorded an average annual decline in GDP per 
capita of some 0.6% over the decade.7 
Somewhat smaller disparities were observed with respect to the 
behaviour of inequality in the distribution of household incomes across 
Latin America. Inequality levels are known to be usually rather stable.8 
Except in periods of systemic upheaval, such as during an economic 
transition from socialism to a market system, aggregate indicators of 
inequality seldom move abruptly. Bearing this generalization out, most 
countries in the sample recorded changes of either exactly zero or very 
close to that. These countries included Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay. There were, as always, exceptions. 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela saw non-negligible increases 
in the Gini coefficient between 1990 and 1999. In the opposite direction, 
Honduras recorded a substantial decline in inequality, on the order of 
8.3%. 
Where did this mix of economic performances leave the region at 
the start of the Millennium? Table 1 contains some relevant statistics on 
average living standards in each country (measured both by per capita 
GDP statistics taken from national accounts data and by mean per capita 
household income figures taken from household surveys); inequality 
(measured by the Gini coefficient for the distribution of household 
incomes per capita); dependency ratios (measured by their inverse, i.e., 
                                                          
7  Reported growth rates (calculated on the basis of 1995 constant dollars) taken from 
ECLAC studies (2002b) may not correspond exactly to “historical path” growth rates 
used in each country’s micro-simulations. On the other hand, while the average annual 
growth rates over 1990-1999 are informative, the reader should bear in mind that they 
obscure often substantial volatility. Three examples come to mind of countries with solid 
―if unspectacular― growth rates in the 1990s which suffered severe recessions at the 
turn of the century: Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay.  
8  See, for instance, Deininger and Squire (1998). 
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the share of the population aged over 15 years); and educational 
attainment (measured by the mean number of completed years of 
schooling). 
It is immediately apparent that the region is very far from being 
homogeneous. GDP per capita ranges from US$ 473 per year in Nicaragua 
to US$ 7 435 per year in Argentina (pre-crisis). Assuming that there is 
some relationship between per capita GDP statistics and material living 
standards, these figures suggest that Argentines had access to over 16 
times more resources in 1999 than did their Nicaraguan counterparts. 
Table 1 
BASIC BACKGROUND INFORMATION, 1999 
Country GDP per 
capitaa 
(US dollars  
per year) 
Mean household 
income per capitab 












Argentina 7 435 580.02 0.53 73.00 9.4 
Bolivia 955 168.75 0.60 60.96 5.6 
Brazil 4 225 594.35 0.64 70.00 6.0 
Chile 5 129 474.98 0.55 72.00 9.8 
Colombia 2 266 496.40 0.55 68.94 5.6 
Costa Rica 3 706 394.00 0.49 63.53 7.5 
Dominican Republic 1 943 491.83 0.47 63.00 6.9 
Ecuador 1 404 158.13 0.56 63.72 6.4 
El Salvador 1 753 148.00 0.52 64.10 6.2 
Guatemala 1 551 257.00 0.58 56.00 4.1 
Honduras 694 146.00 0.57 56.90 5.3 
Mexico 4 577 662.50 0.57 60.87 5.9 
Nicaragua 473 238.00 0.59 58.10 5.9 
Panama 3 274 506.00 0.56 68.10 5.3 
Paraguay 1 603 305.88 0.54 69.00 7.6 
Peru 2 310 178.12 0.50 65.94 7.6 
Uruguay 6 016 570.43 0.44 75.00 9.3 
Venezuela 3 037 365.20 0.49 70.00 7.1 
a  ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 2001 (LC/G.2151-P), Santiago, 
Chile, 2002. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.II.G.1 (in 1995 US dollars). 
b  From household surveys; incomes are monthly. 
National accounts statistics and household surveys seek to measure 
mean living standards in very different ways. Although most household 
surveys used for this report were adjusted in accordance with standard 
ECLAC procedures, which are designed in part to correct for reporting 
errors and discrepancies with national accounts, the two measures still 
yield clearly different results. This is due at least in part to differences 
among the methods and questionnaires of the survey instruments used in 
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each country. Some of the properties of each household survey used in 
the analysis are summarized in table B.1 of the statistical appendix. The 
appendix also contains brief accounts of the ECLAC adjustments and of 
the method used to compute the PPP exchange rate for each country. 
Nevertheless, the disparities reported for mean household incomes 
per capita in the second column of table 2 confirm the diversity of living 
standards across the region. The ranking of each country varies 
somewhat, but the differences ―say, between Honduras or El Salvador, at 
less than US$ 150 per month, on the one hand, and Argentina or Mexico, 
at over US$ 580, on the other― are still remarkable. Part (but clearly not 
all) of these differences stem from differences in educational attainment 
across these countries. For example, there is a difference of over four full 
years of schooling between the average attainment for adults in Bolivia or 
Colombia (5.6 years) and Chile (9.8 years). 
While the disparities across countries in the region are clearly large, 
there is even greater inequality within each country. Latin America and 
the Caribbean consistently record the highest average level of inequality 
for any region in the world (see, for example, World Bank, 2001). And 
indeed, the income Gini coefficients reported in the third column of the 
above table ―ranging from 0.44 in Uruguay to 0.64 in Brazil― are all high 
by international standards. For purposes of comparison, average Gini 
coefficients in other regions in the 1990s ranged from 0.29 in Eastern 
Europe to 0.47 in Sub-Saharan Africa. High-income countries averaged 
0.34 during the decade (Ahuja et al., 1997, p. 26). Yet, while all the Latin 
American countries’ Gini coefficients are, without exception, above both 
the international and OECD averages, it is still the case that the variation 
in this coefficient within the region should not be ignored either. After all, 
20 Gini points separate Uruguay from Brazil. This is equivalent to almost 
half as much inequality as has been measured in the former. 
What are the implications in terms of poverty of this array of recent 
experiences and this diversity both in mean living standards and in 
distribution? As one might expect, the result is also an enormous cross-
country variation. 
Poverty measures in general ―and the incidence of poverty in 
particular― are defined in relation to specific poverty lines and thus vary 
considerably across them. In this report, two lines are used for each 
country. The first is the international “one-dollar-a-day” per capita 
poverty line. As discussed in footnote 3, this is actually equivalent to  
US$ 37.20 per month in 1999 dollar values. This line was used for all 
countries, as indicated in column 1 of table 2 below. In the next column is 
the Millennium poverty reduction target for each country, defined with 
respect to that line. Since that value is half of the incidence observed in 
Meeting the Millennium Poverty Reduction Targets in Latin America and the Caribbean 
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1999, it suffices to double it to obtain the 1999 poverty levels in each 
country. 
In terms of the international extreme poverty line, the incidence of 
extreme poverty in 1999 ranged from 0.2% in Argentina, the Dominican 
Republic and Uruguay, followed by just over 2.0% in Chile, Costa Rica 
and Panama, all the way to around 18% in Ecuador and El Salvador, over 
23% in Honduras and over 26% in Bolivia. In all, there were no fewer than 
six Latin American countries with a level of extreme poverty incidence 
above 10% in 1999, even in respect of this very stringent poverty 
threshold. They were Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Peru. 
The second line is the ECLAC extreme poverty line. This line is 
calculated for each country specifically, and its value varies from country 
to country. In every case, however, it is clearly higher than the 
international one. The exact monthly values for each country are entered 
in column 5 of table 2. The next column indicates what the Millennium 
poverty reduction targets would have been if they had been defined with 
respect to this (higher) line. Incidence levels with respect to these lines in 
1999 can be obtained, as before, by doubling this target figure. Detailed 
information about how these poverty lines are calculated can be obtained 
from ECLAC (2002a). 
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II.  Meeting the target: the macro scenarios 
Clearly, given such disparate “initial” conditions, the various 
countries listed in table 2 will require different combinations of economic 
growth and inequality reduction to meet their respective Millennium 
targets. In order to determine the scale of the growth and inequality-
reduction efforts which each country needs to make, simulations were 
prepared of a set of counterfactual income distributions for each nation 
which were constructed to have exactly the targeted incidence of poverty. 
This was done by scaling up every income in the distribution by a factor 
of (1 + β) ―which proxies for (distribution-neutral) economic growth of 
β% in aggregate terms― while simultaneously reducing inequality (as 
measured by the Gini coefficient) by α%. The details of this process are 
described in the methodological appendix. 
Naturally, the higher the simulated growth rate (the greater the β), 
the less reduction in inequality will be needed to reach the Millennium 
poverty reduction targets (the smaller the α). In fact, it can be shown that, 
for each country and for each line, there exists an entire set of inequality 
reduction rates and rates of accumulated economic growth (α, β)-pairs 
which result in distributions with a poverty incidence exactly equal to the 
target. These sets are known as isopoverty sets, and are described 
formally by equation (6) in the methodological appendix. When plotted in 
a diagram with economic growth rates on the horizontal axis and rates of 
inequality reduction on the vertical axis ((β, α)-space), these sets are 
downward-sloping convex curves, known as isopoverty curves. Two 
examples ―the isopoverty curves for Brazil and Panama― are given in 
figure 1 below. 
In both cases, there are two lines, one corresponding to the 
international “dollar-a-day” poverty line (always the curve with the 
lowest vertical intercept), and the other corresponding to the national 
extreme poverty line calculated by ECLAC. These diagrams are as 
follows: each point in an isopoverty curve corresponds to a distribution 
with exactly one half of the incidence of extreme poverty that was 
observed in the country in 1999 with respect to the relevant poverty line. 
How can that distribution be reached from 1999? Through a cumulative 
growth rate of β% (the coordinate of the point on the horizontal axis) 
combined with a reduction in inequality of α% (the coordinate of the point 
on the vertical axis). 
24  ECLAC 
 
Figure 1 

























Source: Authors' calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
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Analogous figures for each of the 18 countries are provided in the 
statistical appendix. In every case, they are downward sloping (indicating 
that a greater inequality reduction can substitute for some growth in the 
effort to reach given poverty reduction target) and convex (indicating that 
the marginal rate at which this substitution occurs is diminishing). 
These figures are quite informative. Their position tells us 
something about how easy or difficult it is for a given country to meet the 
Millennium targets: the closer to the origin an isopoverty curve lies, the 
less growth and inequality reduction are required to reach it. Their slope 
tells us something about the trade-off between growth and inequality in 
the “mix” used to halve extreme poverty: the steeper the curve, the more 
reduction in the Gini coefficient is needed to offset the loss of one 
percentage point in economic growth. Their β-intercepts tell us how much 
economic growth each country would need in order to meet its own 
Millennium poverty reduction target if its inequality remained constant. 
And their α-intercepts tell us how much inequality reduction (as a share 
of their original Gini coefficient) each country would need in order to 
meet its own Millennium poverty reduction target if its mean income 
level remained constant (i.e., with zero growth). 
Table 2 
ISOPOVERTY CURVES: LINES, INCIDENCE RATES AND INTERCEPTS 
Country Poverty 














Intercepts of the 
isopoverty curve 
(%) 
   α β   α β 
Argentina 37.20 0.1 2.0 41 88.1 3.2 4.0 40.0 
Bolivia 37.20 13.1 16.0 206.9 66.3 19.9 29.8 188.5 
Brazil 37.20 2.0 3.0 86.0 82.7 6.9 6.0 57.0 
Chile 37.20 1.0 6.0 45.0 67.7 3.1 5.0 42.0 
Colombia 37.20 2.6 5.0 104.0 37.7 13.2 16.0 60.0 
Costa Rica 37.20 1.2 6.0 65.0 75.1 6.8 5.0 90.0 
Dominican Republic 37.20 0.1 3.1 22.0 122.7 4.3 6.0 24.0 
Ecuador 37.20 8.9 11.7 76.2 59.7 16.2 20.3 73.6 
El Salvador 37.20 9.3 12.8 78.0 47.0 12.3 16.0 73.0 
Guatemala 37.20 3.4 4.3 36.0 92.0 18.0 16.8 57.0 
Honduras 37.20 11.7 11.6 62.0 95.0 28.6 50.0 117.0 
Mexico 37.20 3.2 7.0 55.0 113.6 11.6 5.0 70.0 
Nicaragua 37.20 7.7 9.0 112.0 114.0 22.5 32.2 108.0 
Panama 37.20 1.2 2.2 40.0 92.0 6.8 6.7 48.0 
Paraguay 37.20 3.5 17.0 78.0 99.1 14.4 17.0 80.0 
Peru 37.20 7.6 8.6 55.9 57.3 11.7 16.6 79.4 
Uruguay 37.20 0.1 1.0 1.0 75.5 0.9 3.0 16.0 
Venezuela 37.20 2.0 14.0 57.0 112.1 9.7 14.0 55.0 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
a  This is a monthly poverty line corresponding to the 1999 (June) value of the original poverty line 
(1995 US$ 1.00 per day per person). Its value is expressed in 1999 United States dollars at purchasing 
power parity exchange rates. 
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Table 2 above lists these intercepts for every country, for both lines. 
The results are rather remarkable: with no change in inequality, the 
cumulative rates of growth required to meet even reasonably modest 
poverty reduction targets are quite large. Only for countries that combine 
already high levels of mean income and low levels of inequality ―such as 
Uruguay― are these β-intercepts low. For countries with a great degree of 
inequality, they can be quite high, even if the poverty reduction target 
does not seem large. Consider the case of Brazil, which would have to 
reduce the incidence of extreme poverty, with respect to the “dollar-a-
day” line from 4% to 2%. It turns out that, if its Lorenz curve were not to 
move at all, this would require accumulated economic growth of 86%. To 
achieve this in 15 years would require an average annual per capita GDP 
growth rate of 4.0%. This is a substantially higher rate than the Brazilian 
economy has managed to achieve at any time in the last 20 years. 
Brazil is not an exception. A cursory look at column 4 of table 2 will 
reveal often surprisingly large requirements for the growth rate, given 
stable inequality. With the exception of Uruguay, the required rates range 
from 22% for the Dominican Republic to 207% for Bolivia. The numbers 
are similarly high with respect to the national (ECLAC) poverty lines, 
shown in the eighth column. This similarity should prompt another 
observation: there is no proportionality between the poverty target and 
the growth rate required to meet it. In fact, the isopoverty curves for the 
two different lines in the same country often cross, indicating that more 
growth is required to halve a lower poverty rate (with respect to a lower 
line) than to halve a higher poverty rate (with respect to a higher line). 
The curves shown for Brazil in figure 1(a) are one example; others include 
the curves for Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela. 
This apparent puzzle is explained by the bell shape of the density 
curves for the distributions of (log) income. The closer a poverty line is to 
the mean of a distribution, the more mass lies close to it, from below. 
Hence, the larger the return of economic growth in terms of poverty 
reduction, “sliding” the density function past the poverty threshold. 
When the poverty incidence that remains is very small and the country is 
very unequal (such as Brazil, for example), one needs a great deal of 
rightward movement in the mean (growth) to slide half the mass below 
the very flat tail, past the poverty line. 
For very low poverty incidences, this mechanism comes into play 
even for countries with relatively less inequality. This is the case, for 
instance, of the Dominican Republic, which still needs an accumulated 
rate of economic growth of 22% just to move 0.1% of its population above 
the poverty line. 
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However instructive the general shape of the isopoverty curves 
may be, even more can be learned if a few specific points on each curve 
are looked at more closely. For the purposes of this report, five such 
points are considered for each country. Three of these points lie along 
what is referred to here as the “historical ray”, which is determined by its 
slope αh/βh; αh is the percentage decline in the Gini coefficient actually 
observed in the country between 1990 and 1999, while βh is the actual 
accumulated percentage growth in GDP per capita observed in the 
country between 1990 and 1999.9 By drawing this ray and considering the 
coordinates of points along it, it is possible to extrapolate the effectiveness 
of poverty reduction efforts by the country if its performance as regards 
these two dimensions remains unchanged since the 1990s. 
Table 3 
HALVING THE INCIDENCE OF EXTREME POVERTY WITH RESPECT TO THE  






point A coordinates 
Road to “Maxiland”: 
point D coordinates 
 α β Years α β 
Argentina b 37.20 0.1 1.0 15.0 7 2 5 
Bolivia 37.20 13.1 n.c.* n.c. ∞ 4.7 90.6 
Brazil 37.20 2.0 0.0 86.0 48 2.5 7.3 
Chile b 37.20 1.0 2.0 60.0 10 3.0 20.0 
Colombia 37.20 2.6 4.2 9.5 7 3.7 15.6 
Costa Rica 37.20 1.2 1.6 39.0 30 2.4 33.0 
Dominican Republic 37.20 0.1 1.6 9.5 2 1.2 12.6 
Ecuador 37.20 8.9 n.c.* n.c. ∞ 2.2 53.0 
El Salvador 37.20 9.3 0.0 78.0 52 1.8 60.0 
Guatemala 37.20 3.4 0.0 34.0 22 1.6 20.0 
Honduras 37.20 11.7 11.0 2.0 12 1.9 49.0 
Mexico 37.20 3.2 1.4 40.0 44 3.3 23.0 
Nicaragua 37.20 7.7 0.0 112.0 50 3.6 48.0 
Panama 37.20 1.2 0.7 25.0 10 1.6 9.0 
Paraguay b 37.20 3.5 4.0 5.0 25 2.0 25.0 
Peru 37.20 7.6 n.c.* n.c. ∞ 1.5 42.4 
Uruguay 37.20 0.1 0.3 0.6 1 0.07 0.9 
Venezuela b 37.20 2.0 5.0 10 85 3.0 42.0 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
a  This is a monthly poverty line corresponding to the 1999 (June) value of the original poverty line (1995 
US$ 1.00 per day per person). Its value is expressed in 1999 United States dollars at purchasing power 
parity exchange rates.  
b  Historical ray slopes for these countries reflect team estimates of future performance and are not based 
on actual historical performance. 
Note: Entries “n.c.” indicate that the historical performance would lead to an increase ―rather than a 
reduction― in poverty, and the trajectory therefore never crosses this isopoverty line. In order for this 
situation to arise, either α or β (or both) must be negative. The * indicates which one is negative. 
                                                          
9  For four countries ―Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Venezuela― the slope of the 
historical ray differs from their actual performance in the 1990s. Instead, the α, β 
coordinates of point C for these countries reflect the researchers’ best estimates of how 
their economies are likely to perform in 2000-2015. 
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The three points along the “historical ray” that have been selected 
are its intersection with the dollar-a-day isopoverty curve (point A); its 
intersection with the national (ECLAC) isopoverty curve (point C) and the 
point whose coordinates are the accumulated growth (β) and inequality 
reduction (α) rates that the country would have after 15 years, given the 
annual rates observed in the 1990s (point B). These three points are shown 
for Brazil and Panama in figure 1. Those for all the other countries are 
given in the statistical appendix. The coordinates of point A are also 
reported for every country in table 3 above, whereas those of point C are 
shown in table 4 below. In both tables, the column entitled “years” 
indicates in how many years the corresponding point would be reached, 
given the historical growth and inequality reduction rates implicit in the 
construction of the ray. 
Table 4 
HALVING THE INCIDENCE OF POVERTY WITH RESPECT  
TO THE ECLAC EXTREME POVERTY LINE 
Country Poverty line 




point C coordinates 
Road to “Maxiland”: 
point E coordinates 
   α β Years α β 
Argentina 88.10 3.2 2.0 20.0 8 4.5 20.0 
Bolivia 66.30 19.9 n.c.* n.c. ∞ 5.8 111.0 
Brazil 82.73 6.9 0.0 57.0 35 4.0 11.3 
Chile 67.75 3.1 0.0 48.0 8 3.5 20.0 
Colombia 37.68 13.2 8.5 19.4 14 6.4 26.4 
Costa Rica 75.10 6.8 1.8 40.5 39 2.0 34.0 
Dominican Republic 122.70 4.3 2.3 13.5 3 1.6 16.3 
Ecuador 59.72 16.2 n.c.* n.c. ∞ 2.5 59.5 
El Salvador 47.00 12.3 0.0 73.0 49 1.8 60.0 
Guatemala 92.00 18.0 0.0 57.0 32 3.4 41.0 
Honduras 95.00 28.6 45.5 6.0 42 3.9 99.0 
Mexico 113.60 11.9 3.2 22.0 48 2.5 23.5 
Nicaragua 114.00 22.5 0.0 108.0 49 5.6 75.0 
Panama 92.00 6.8 1.0 38.0 14 3.6 18.0 
Paraguay 99.13 14.4 13.0 12.0 58 4.3 48.0 
Peru 57.27 11.7 0.0 79.4 33 2.2 62.5 
Uruguay 75.50 0.9 1.7 3.3 2 0.7 9.8 
Venezuela 112.10 9.7 9.0 15.0 124 2.9 39.0 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
Note: Entries “n.c.” indicate that the historical performance leads to an increase ―rather than a 
reduction― in poverty, and the trajectory therefore never crosses this isopoverty line. For this situation to 
arise, either α or β (or both) must be negative. The * indicates which one is negative. 
Meeting the Millennium Poverty Reduction Targets in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
29
The coordinates of points A and C reveal that Colombia and 
Honduras were the only Latin American countries to experience 
substantial inequality reductions in the 1990s. Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay had positive ―but small― 
inequality reductions over this period. Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, and Peru experienced virtually no change. 
Bolivia and Ecuador actually saw increases in inequality over this 
period. In fact, the increases were sufficiently large that, if extended 
forward and combined with the observed growth rates in the 1990s, 
poverty would continue to increase indefinitely and there would thus be 
no convergence towards the Millennium poverty targets at all. The same 
is true of Paraguay and Venezuela, although this cannot be seen in the 
table because a different set of growth and inequality reduction 
parameters was chosen for the construction of their macro-simulations. 
The importance of inequality reduction helping to meet these 
targets is evident from the figures showing how long each country can be 
expected to take to meet its own target, given its performance in the 
1990s. The Dominican Republic and Uruguay would meet it in one or two 
years. Argentina (pre-crisis) and Colombia would each take seven years. 
Chile and Panama would need a decade, while Honduras would reach its 
target in 12 years, which would still be before the 2015 deadline. No other 
country would do so, however. Even though Brazil only needs to reduce 
extreme poverty by two percentage points, it would still take it 48 years to 
do so. Mexico would take 44 years to get 3.2 percentage points of its 
population past the line. 
This can be clearly seen in figure 2, where the vertical axis 
measures the number of years each country would take to halve its 
extreme poverty rate (with respect to the dollar-a-day line) if its economy 
were to continue to perform (in terms of growth and inequality reduction) 
as it did in the 1990s for an indefinite amount of time into the future.10 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru are not on the chart since, along this historical 
path, extreme poverty would actually rise in those countries. In fact, only 
7 of the 18 countries considered in this study would meet their 
Millennium poverty reduction targets: Argentina (pre-crisis), Chile, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay. 
Five of the seven are countries where inequality fell during the 1990s. The 
other two are Argentina, which was the richest country in 1999, and Chile, 
which was the region's growth leader by a comfortable margin. 
 
                                                          
10  Again, with the exception of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Venezuela. See previous 
footnote. 
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Figure 2 
TIME REQUIRED TO HALVE EXTREME POVERTY IN THE REGION 
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Source: Authors' calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
Note: Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru are not shown in these figures because their historical paths do not lead 
to a reduction in poverty.  is the correlation coefficient between the variables shown in each panel. 
On the horizontal axis, figure 2 contains the 1999 values of three 
relevant indicators for each country. The initial incidence of extreme 
poverty is shown in panel A; the initial Gini coefficient is given in panel B, 
and the initial mean level of household per capita income is shown in 
panel C. The simple correlation coefficients between each of these 
variables and years are indicated in the corresponding panels. The 
correlations are positive for initial poverty and inequality levels, 
indicating that the more poverty there is to reduce, the longer it takes, and 
that being in a country with greater inequality makes it harder to do this. 
The correlation with mean income is negative, as expected. 
In order to consider an alternative path to the historical ray, yet 
another hypothetical exercise has been undertaken. With admittedly less 
imagination than has been shown by some other Latin American writers, 
the authors of this report have constructed a little economists' utopia of 
their own, named “Maxiland”.11 This imaginary country has high average 
living standards (for Latin America) and a mean household income per 
capita of US$ 1 242 per month. It is also more egalitarian than any real 
country in the region, with a Gini coefficient of 0.4. 
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For each country, the ray through the origin in (α, β)-space with 
slope αm/βm was then considered, where αm is the proportional difference 
between the country's Gini coefficient and that of “Maxiland” (0.4), and 
βm is the proportional difference between the country's mean household 
income level and that of “Maxiland” (US$ 1 242). The position that 
“Maxiland” would occupy in any given country's (α, β)-space is not a 
point of interest per se. What is important is the slope of the “road” that 
leads there (αm/βm). 
The reason that this road is interesting is because it is an alternative 
to the historical path designed to lead from the country's current situation 
towards one in which it is slightly richer than the richest countries and 
slightly more egalitarian than the least inegalitarian countries in the 
region. It is thus intended to embody (however imperfectly) the concept 
of an attainable ideal. Along the Road to Maxiland, two points have been 
selected. Point D is where it intercepts the “dollar-a-day” isopoverty line. 
Point E is where it intercepts the national (ECLAC) isopoverty line. 
The coordinates of point D are given for each country in table 3, 
and those of point E are given for each country in table 4. The Roads to 
Maxiland are steeper than the historical path for every country except 
Colombia, Honduras and Uruguay.12 Since the diagrams have been 
plotted with growth rates (β) on the horizontal axis and inequality 
reductions (α) on the vertical axis, a steeper ray implies a path towards 
the poverty reduction targets which relies more heavily on inequality 
reduction. The fact that, for all but three of the 18 countries, this 
hypothetical path to Maxiland is steeper than the one based on actual 
experience in the 1990s suggests that alternative strategies which rely 
more actively on redistribution might provide interesting alternatives to 
the current policy combinations, which have yielded very limited success 
in terms of inequality reduction. 
A comparison of the β-intercepts across columns 4 and 7 in tables 3 
and 4 reveals how the accumulated growth requirements change as a 
country switches from the historical ray to the Road to Maxiland. For 
most countries, the reductions in the growth requirement that arise from 
relatively modest reductions in inequality are very considerable. In the 
case of Brazil, for instance, a move from stable inequality to a reduction of 
2.5% in the Gini coefficient reduce the accumulated growth requirement 
from 86% to 7.3%.13 These reductions are less dramatic for countries with 
less inequality, but they are still substantial. For Panama, a mere tweak in 
the rate of inequality reduction (from α = 0.7 to α = 1.6) reduces the 
                                                          
12  And Paraguay, as drawn. As noted above, however, its "historical" path is not really 
historical. 
13  With respect to the dollar-a-day line, in table 3. 
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growth requirement by almost two thirds (from 25% to 9%). The nature of 
this trade-off is depicted in figure 3 below. 
Figure 3 






























Source: Authors' calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
Note: The dark-coloured bar measures the accumulated rate of economic growth required to meet the 
poverty reduction target based on the historical ray. The number at the end of each bar denotes the 
accumulated rate of reduction in the Gini coefficient which underlies that growth requirement. The light-
coloured bar measures the growth requirement based on the Road to “Maxiland”. The underlined number 
at the end of each light-coloured bar denotes the accumulated rate of reduction in the Gini coefficient 
which underlies that growth requirement. 
Figure 3 shows that if Ecuador were to succeed in reducing its Gini 
coefficient by a mere 2.2% over a period of 15 years, it would require 
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poverty. This contrasts with a historical performance which, if continued, 
would lead to ever-increasing poverty. Nicaragua, which did not reduce 
its inequality level in the 1990s and which would, under the same 
conditions, need to more than double its GDP per capita in order to halve 
extreme poverty, would need less than 50% growth if it managed to 
reduce its inequality by some 3.6%. 
Another way to visualize the recent performance of Latin American 
and Caribbean nations with regard to poverty reduction is presented in 
figure 4 below. Here the horizontal axis measures monthly mean 
household income per capita in 1999 PPP United States dollars. The 
vertical axis measures the Gini coefficient on an inverted scale. The scales 
have been chosen so that the heavy square at the extreme upper right 
hand corner of the “box” marks the exact location of the hypothetical 
target, Maxiland. The real countries in the sample are scattered  across the 
diagram, as follows: the point right next to each country's acronym 
denotes its initial (1999) position. The point at the other end of the line 
denotes its simulated final (2015) position based on the country’s 
historical path (i.e., assuming that the country’s average performance in 
terms of economic growth and inequality reduction over the next 15 years 
will be the same as its historical record for the 1990s).14 This final point is 
marked with a star if ―and only if― at that position the country would 
have met the poverty reduction target with respect to the international 
poverty line. 
Figure 4 contains a great deal of information. First of all, it is 
possible to locate the seven countries which, as shown in figure 2 and 
table 4 above, would meet their Millennium targets. They are Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama and 
Uruguay. This group includes most of the countries that succeeded in 
reducing inequality during the 1990s. Note that Argentina manages to 
meet the target despite a sizeable increase in inequality, thanks to its good 
growth performance “on average” in the 1990s. Chile also succeeds, even 
though it failed to reduce its level of inequality, because of its superb 
growth performance. Among those that do not meet the target in these 
simulations, Costa Rica and Mexico have good performances, based on 
positive rates of growth and of inequality reduction. At the other extreme, 
the most worrisome cases are Paraguay, where growth was negative in 
per capita terms and inequality rose, and Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, 
where the deterioration in inequality was so large that their modest 
historical growth rates would not suffice to reduce poverty. 
                                                          
14  In this figure, actual historical records are used for all countries, including Argentina, 
Chile, Paraguay and Venezuela. 

















Source: Authors' calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
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III. Meeting the target: the micro scenarios 
So far, this discussion about meeting the Millennium poverty 
reduction targets has been couched in terms of different combinations of 
economic growth and reductions in inequality. While this has been 
informative, it is clear that both increases in average income and changes 
in the dispersion of the distribution are outcomes of a complex range of 
inter-related economic processes. This section will focus on some of the 
results from a second set of simulation exercises which consisted in 
identifying different ways in which one particular combination ―a 
desired rate of growth (corresponding to a given β) and the 
corresponding rate of inequality reduction (α)― could be achieved. This 





Here, μ(y) denotes mean income per capita; d is the economy-wide 
ratio of the number of adults to the size of the population (the inverse of a 
dependency ratio); t is the ratio of employed adults to total adults in the 
population (a measure of the occupation rate); q is a measure of the 
productivity of aggregate human capital; h is a measure of the value of 
human capital per employed worker; ya is mean income from non-human 
assets; and yr is mean income from transfers. The last two terms are 
derived directly from reported incomes in the adjusted household-level 
data sets; h and q are calculated from a Mincer-type identity using a 
procedure that is described in the methodological appendix.15 
It follows that a given rate of aggregate economic growth 
―denoted in section 2 as (1+β)μ― can be obtained by various different 
combinations of changes in the ratios on the right-hand side of the above 
identity. In particular, if the dependency ratio and incomes from assets 




                                                          
15  This appendix also contains a derivation of the above aggregate identity from the 
underlying analogous identity at the household level and specifies the assumptions 
under which the aggregation is valid. 
( ) [ ]ra yytqhdy ++≡µ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]rrahqt yyhqtdy δδδδµβ ++++++=+ 11111
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where the δs denote proportional variations in the respective variables. 
Clearly, from a purely algebraic point of view, combinations of positive δs 
can be chosen to support a given growth rate implied by a certain value of 
β, with three degrees of freedom. Since this simulation exercise is indeed 
statistical in nature, and no account is taken of the behavioural 
consistency across economic agents, it was deemed appropriate to restrict 
the set of δs to be considered to two specific combinations. 
The two sets of δ parameters considered for each country were the 
underlying points C and E in section 2. The reader will recall that these 
points lie at the intersection between each country's isopoverty curve for 
the national (ECLAC) poverty line and the country's historical ray and 
Road to Maxiland, respectively. For each corresponding aggregate growth 
rate, the set (δt, δq, δh, δr) is chosen so as to lie on the line running from the 
country's current values (t, q, h, r) towards Maxiland's own (hypothetical) 
values (t, q, h , r). These values are presented in the bottom lines of tables 
5 and 6. The exact location of the δs along that line is defined by the need 
to support the aggregate growth rate (β) for point C (or E) exactly. 
Table 5 
THE MICRO SCENARIOS UNDERLYING POINT C (ALONG THE HISTORICAL PATH) 
































Argentina 49.0 15.0 275.7 2.0 4.17 0.0 100.60 3.0 
Boliviaa 55.0  90.1  4.60  27.38  
Brazil 54.0 12.0 257.0 24.0 3.00 34.0 165.00 43.0 
Chile 49.0 16.0 214.6 34.0 4.74 4.0 5.16 36.0 
Colombia 57.1 10.0 249.6 3.0 4.01 16.0 82.83 17.0 
Costa Rica 64.0 3.2 250.0 56.3 4.10 0.25 130.00 65.0 
Dominican 
Republic 
54.0 19.0 288.3 2.0 3.19 10.0 137.34 18.0 
Ecuadora 58.4  78.3  4.58  22.89  
El Salvador 51.2 21.0 120.0 21.0 3.20 23.0 32.00 28.0 
Guatemala 63.9 21.0 161.0 22.0 3.28 18.0 43.00 29.0 
Honduras 57.0 2.0 122.0 2.0 3.02 2.0 24.00 2.0 
Mexico 68.0 7.9 320.0 16.0 4.70 17.5 225.00 80.0 
Nicaragua 54.6 25.0 181.0 35.0 3.73 29.0 33.00 31.0 
Panama 52.7 9.0 249.0 18.0 4.11 12.0 113.00 40.0 
Paraguay 56.0 2.0 181.8 2.0 3.48 8.0 42.87 21.0 
Peru 53.9 6.2 72.8 80.6 4.91 1.7 38.39 80.6 
Uruguay 53.0 1.0 220.3 1.0 3.80 1.0 155.67 7.0 
Venezuela 54.0 2.0 244.4 1.0 3.32 14.0 20.37 0.0 
“Maxiland” 70.0  350  5  300  
Source: Authors' calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
a Since Bolivia and Ecuador do not converge at the required isopoverty line, point C is not defined for 
them, and no micro-simulation was undertaken. 
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Table 5 reports the current (1999) levels of the four key parameters 
for each of the countries that could change in this exercise. These 
parameters are the proportion of adults who are employed, t (ranging 
from 49% in Argentina and Chile to 68% in Mexico); a measure of the 
productivity of human capital in job matches, q (which ranges from 
US$ 73 in Peru to US$ 288 in the Dominican Republic); a measure of the 
stock of human capital, which is some multiple of the exponential of one 
tenth of the completed years of schooling in each country, h (ranging 
from 3.0 in Brazil to 4.9 in Peru); and public transfer incomes, which range 
from US$ 5.00 in Chile to US$ 225 in Mexico.16 The table then reports the 
relevant δs that would take each country from its 1999 position to point C, 
where its historical trajectory meets the national isopoverty curve. 
In other words, these are the sets of proportional changes in 
employment, productivity, human capital and transfers which would 
support the growth rates required to halve the incidence of extreme 
poverty in each of these countries (with respect to the national poverty 
lines calculated by ECLAC), if the countries were to continue to perform 
as they did in the 1990s in terms of the growth/inequality reduction mix. 
Table 6 contains exactly the same information for the levels of t, d, q 
and h, but the changes (i.e., δs) they report would take each country from 
its 1999 position to point E, where its Road to Maxiland meets the national 
isopoverty curve. In other words, table 6 reports the sets of proportional 
changes in employment, productivity, human capital and transfers which 
would support the growth rates required to halve the incidence of extreme 
poverty in each of these countries according to the national poverty lines 
calculated by ECLAC if, instead of performing as they did in the 1990s, the 
countries were to adopt a growth/inequality reduction mix which would 
taken them towards the hypothetical Maxiland combination. 
A comparison of the columns showing the required changes in 
employment (or occupation rates) reveals that increases in employment 
rates would often be higher along the historical path than they would if 
countries changed their strategies and strove to become more like 
Maxiland. This is simply because, as has been seen, for most countries the 
latter strategy would require a higher reduction in inequality and less 
growth. Greater occupational ratios tend to increase growth rates, rather 
than reduce inequality, and hence would be relied upon less by a country 
moving along the Road to Maxiland than they have been on the historical 
ray. Honduras is an instructive example. It is not only one of the very few 
countries which would have to increase its β/α ratio if it were to move from 
                                                          
16  Transfer data from household surveys are particularly perilous for cross-country 
comparisons, since, because of differences between questionnaires, the variables may be 
defined in very different ways across countries. 
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the historical ray to the Road to Maxiland, but it is also one of the very few 
that would require a greater increase in employment if it were to move 
along the latter than along the former. 
Table 6 
THE MICRO SCENARIOS UNDERLYING POINT E 
(ALONG THE ROAD TO MAXILAND) 
































Argentina 49.00 4.2 275.70 15.2 4.17 5.9 100.6 2.9 
Bolivia 55.05 9.6 90.06 88.2 4.60 8.6 27.38 88.2 
Brazil 54.00 3.0 257.00 4.0 3.00 6.0 165.00 22.0 
Chile 49.00 8.5 214.63 8.1 4.74 1.0 5.16 600.0 
Colombia 57.07 9.0 249.53 4.0 4.01 21.0 82.83 6.0 
Costa Rica 70.00 12.9 350.00 119.0 5.00 25.0 166.20 110.0 
Dominican 
Republic 
54.00 6.2 288.32 4.5 3.19 11.8 137.34 1.1 
Ecuador 58.44 0.0 78.30 51.1 4.58 9.1 22.89 51.1 
El Salvador 51.20 6.0 120.00 30.0 3.20 9.0 32.00 130.0 
Guatemala 63.90 2.0 161.00 24.0 3.28 11.0 43.00 122.0 
Honduras 57.00 6.0 122.00 50.0 3.02 17.0 24.00 298.0 
Mexico 70.00 11.0 350.00 26.8 5.00 25.0 166.20 101.0 
Nicaragua 54.60 9.0 181.00 31.0 3.73 11.0 33.00 268.0 
Panama 52.70 6.0 249.00 7.0 4.11 4.0 113.00 30.0 
Paraguay 56.00 2.4 181.81 30.7 3.48 18.6 42.87 6.9 
Peru 53.88 6.2 72.83 62.1 4.91 1.7 38.39 62.1 
Uruguay 53.00 4.0 220.33 7.4 3.80 3.9 155.67 0.2 
Venezuela 54.00 15.2 244.38 2.8 3.32 22.5 20.37 14.7 
“Maxiland” 70.00  350  5  300  
Source: Authors' calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
Required changes in the productivity parameter q and in the 
measure of human capital stock h vary in a less consistent manner 
between tables 5 and 6. Naturally, in this simulation the countries with 
the lowest levels of  human capital productivity, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Honduras and Peru, are required to make very considerable increases 
indeed. This is particularly true when they are simulated to move 
towards the (relatively high) Maxiland levels. 
Like required increases in employment, simulated required 
increases in the stock of human capital also tend to be higher along the 
historical ray (towards point C, in table 5) than along the Road to 
Maxiland (towards point E, in table 6). This is, once again, because these 
increases are more closely related to increases in mean income than to 
declines in inequality. According to the data shown in table 5, the 
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countries that need to make the greatest effort in terms of education and 
other investments in human capital are Brazil, Nicaragua and El Salvador. 
Changes in transfers would be almost uniformly higher along the 
Road to Maxiland than along the historical path because they tend to 
contribute to a reduction in inequality. The simulations indicate that, in 
order to move towards the characteristics assumed for Maxiland while 
simultaneously halving the incidence of extreme poverty, some countries 
would need to increase the generosity of their fiscal systems by up to 
three or four times (as in Nicaragua and Honduras, for instance) or by 
even more in the case of Chile. 
The reader should be aware, of course, that these simulations suffer 
from a number of natural limitations. First, they are based on an 
accounting framework (given by equations (7) and (8’) in the 
methodological appendix) which makes a set of fairly unrealistic 
assumptions about the nature of the relationship between labour incomes 
and education. The identities are identities, but an identity is only as good 
as the variables defined in it. 
Second, the simulations take no account of behavioural consistency 
constraints. There is no guarantee that an equilibrium (of any sort) exists 
which supports the various changes that have been simulated. What the 
exercise shows is what the statistical outcomes of such an equilibrium 
would be in terms of poverty reduction should such an equilibrium (a) 
exist, and (b) be reached. Third, the results in this section, in particular, 
are entirely dependent on the assumptions underlying the imaginary 
construct of Maxiland. They are only as interesting as Maxiland itself. 
The main lesson to be drawn from this second stage of the 
simulations is, however, a simple and powerful one: there are many ways 
to reach the cumulative rates of growth and inequality reduction which 
were calculated in section 2 as being required for these countries to meet 
their Millennium poverty reduction targets. For most countries in the 
sample (provided that eminently reasonable reductions in their very high 
levels of inequality are somehow achieved), most of the requirements for 
growth look plausible. 
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IV. Conclusions and policy implications 
This report has presented the results of a set of macro- and micro-
simulation exercises having two aims. The first was to assess the 
likelihood that each of 18 countries in Latin America would meet their 
Millennium targets for the reduction of extreme poverty by the year 2015, 
under the assumption that they replicated, in the period 2000-2015, their 
own growth and inequality-reduction performances of the 1990s. The 
second was to construct alternative scenarios, supposing that the same 
countries could depart from their previous track record and move along a 
new path. For the sake of concreteness, these alternative paths were 
simulated in such a way that they would take each country closer to a 
regional ideal: an imaginary country (dubbed Maxiland) that is both 
richer and more egalitarian than any in the region. 
For this second exercise, the researchers went beyond the aggregate 
simulations and sought to illustrate how the required growth rates could 
be sustained microeconomically, through different combinations of 
increases in the quantity and productivity of human capital, the level of 
employment, and/or the level of public transfers. 
The findings were actually quite surprising: surprisingly sobering 
with regard to the first objective and surprisingly optimistic with regard 
to the second. The simulations based on each country’s recent (1990s) 
performance suggested that only 7 of the 18 countries would succeed in 
halving extreme poverty (with respect to the officially adopted 
international poverty line) by 2015. They are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay. Apart from 
Argentina, which was the richest country in the sample according to the 
1999 data and whose situation may need to be reviewed in light of the 
very sharp contraction in output seen during the past three years, the only 
feature common to all of these countries is that they had either reduced 
their inequality levels during the 1990s or, in the case of Chile, at least 
kept it from rising while undergoing very rapid growth. 
This leaves 11 Latin American and Caribbean countries which are 
not expected to meet the target if their growth and inequality dynamics of 
the 1990s are replicated during 2000-2015. These countries can be divided 
into two subgroups. The first subgroup is composed of those countries 
whose recent performance has led to rising poverty rates. These countries, 
which will therefore never reach the target unless they change their 
trajectory, give cause for the most serious concern. They are Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. The other six countries are ones 
in which inequality reduction and growth have been too sluggish to halve 
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poverty within the allotted 15 years, but which will eventually do so even 
if their performance remains as it was in the 1990s. This intermediate 
group consists of Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and 
Nicaragua. 
These results say more about each country's performance in the 
1990s than about how difficult it will be for the country to halve the 
incidence of extreme poverty in any absolute sense. As the alternative 
simulation exercises indicate, it would not be overly difficult for any of 
these 11 countries to reach their poverty reduction target, provided they 
were able to implement policy changes leading to more substantial 
reductions in their levels of income inequality. The main obstacle to 
poverty reduction has generally not been that the magnitude of the 
required poverty reduction is too great. Although there are six countries 
with initial poverty rates in excess of 10%, the example of Honduras 
shows that this could be reversed rather quickly if inequality is reduced. 
With 23.4% of the population living below the international poverty line 
in 1999, Honduras has the second highest initial incidence of extreme 
poverty in the sample. Nonetheless, it is among the seven countries which 
would be successful even on the basis of their past track record, thanks to 
the substantial reduction in its inequality level that occurred in the 1990s. 
The alternative simulations run for each country, under a 
hypothetical scenario where each becomes more like Maxiland, are the 
simulations which give grounds for some conditional optimism. Except 
for Bolivia and El Salvador, all the countries in the sample could meet 
their targets with respect to the international poverty line by combining 
average annual growth rates in GDP per capita of less than 3%, with 
cumulative reductions in their Gini coefficients of less than 4%. For El 
Salvador, the Road to Maxiland would require a 1.8% reduction in the 
Gini coefficient but an annualized growth rate of 3.2%. Bolivia would 
need a little more: a 4.7% reduction in the Gini coefficient and a 4.4% 
annual growth rate in GDP per capita. 
In order to check the robustness of the results with respect to the 
choice of poverty line, and also to allow for poverty thresholds slightly 
less severe than the original dollar-a-day line, analogous simulations were 
conducted with respect to country-specific extreme poverty lines 
proposed by ECLAC. Although the lines were often much higher than the 
international line, growth and inequality requirements were not much 
larger. This is not as surprising as it might appear at first glance since, 
when poverty lines are higher, there are many more people just below 
them. In such cases, halving the incidence of poverty may actually require 
less effort in terms of economic growth and inequality reduction, as it will 
be easier to move larger numbers of people over the line. As the 
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coordinates of point E (in table 4) indicate, only Bolivia and Nicaragua 
would require both a reduction in the Gini coefficient in excess of 5% and 
a annual growth rate in GDP per capita greater than 2% to meet the target 
with respect to their country-specific poverty lines. 
The main problem appears to be that distribution-neutral economic 
growth is not a very powerful factor in improving the living conditions of 
the extremely poor. Proportional improvements in incomes which can 
make considerable dents in deprivation at higher echelons of the income 
distribution make little difference for the truly destitute. At a very basic 
level, it may be noted that 10% of fifty cents per day is only five cents. It 
may help, but not very much. 
This does not imply that growth is either bad or irrelevant. 
Economic growth is a fundamental element in improving the living 
conditions of all members of society, including many who are very poor. 
It also helps to relax political-economy constraints on redistribution and 
other useful reforms. The results do indicate, however, that, for the 
specific purposes of reducing the incidence of extreme forms of income 
deprivation, redistribution is considerably more powerful than growth.  
The slopes of the isopoverty curves shown in figure 1 and in the statistical  
appendix, as well as the numbers in figure 3, reveal that rather small 
declines in the Gini coefficient (often as little as 2%-3%, which 
corresponds to less than two points of the coefficient) can reduce poverty 
by as much as 60% or 70% in accumulated growth rates. 
It should be made very clear that the authors do not view growth 
and inequality reduction as economic substitutes. They are substitutes in 
terms of generating a given level of poverty reduction only in a statistical 
sense: if a country were to reduce its Gini coefficient by 2%, then it would 
need to grow less to meet a given poverty reduction target. If the 
country's growth rate ―or its rate of inequality reduction― were higher 
than that statistical necessity, so much the better: poverty would go lower 
still. 
In fact, there is every reason to suspect that some amount of 
redistribution, provided that it is implemented effectively and efficiently, 
might in fact contribute to more economic growth ―largely by 
unleashing the human and material investment potential of poor people.17 
And in the other direction, more growth can probably make it easier to 
                                                          
17  The theoretical and empirical literature on the economic relationships between income 
distribution and growth is now vast. Cross-country empirical results are often 
contradictory and inconclusive (see Forbes, 2000 and Banerjee and Duflo, 2000), but 
there is growing microeconomic evidence that equity and efficiency can often be jointly 
enhanced. See, for example, Banerjee et al. (2001). 
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reduce inequality, not only because of the direct creation of economic 
opportunity through more employment and higher profit possibilities, 
but also because it can help to relax the constraints on redistribution and 
thus make is more politically feasible. In other words, while the 
economics of the interaction between growth and redistribution lie 
outside the scope of this analysis, there is every reason to suspect that the 
two ―just as they can serve as statistical substitutes for each other in 
reducing poverty― are complementary in terms of economic policy. 
Further research is needed to determine what kinds of economic 
policies could help to achieve the reductions in inequality and the rates of 
economic growth used in these simulations and could be applied in an 
economically consistent manner ―that is to say, in a way that respects 
incentive compatibility constraints and that supports market equilibrium. 
Such research could be of considerable interest to policy makers, since 
policy design needs to be concerned with incentive issues and economic 
consistency to a much greater extent than this statistical exercise has been. 
On the other hand, such research would involve complex general 
equilibrium issues, and the relevant applications are still in their 
infancy.18 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the main 
obstacle to the success of poverty reduction efforts in Latin America and 
the Caribbean is that the medicine which is most effective in treating the 
poverty that afflicts the region ―inequality reduction― is one that the 
region seems to find very difficult to dispense. A little inequality 
reduction would go a long way towards reducing extreme deprivation in 
this region. Yet very few of the region’s economies seem to have been able 
to generate even small reductions of this type. 
High social returns would certainly be yielded by policies that 
succeed in redistributing resources to those who need them most and in 
doing so at the least possible cost in terms of distorting the incentives that 






                                                          
18  For complementary early approaches, see Bourguignon et al. (2002) and Robillard et al. 
(2001). 




Ahuja, V. and others (1997), Everyone's Miracle?: Revisiting Poverty and 
Inequality in East Asia, Washington, D.C., World Bank. 
Banerjee, A. and E. Duflo (2000), “Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data 
Say?”, NBER Working Paper, No. 7793. 
Banerjee, A. and others (2001), “Inequality, control rights, and rent seeking: sugar 
cooperatives in Maharashtra”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 109, No. 1. 
Bourguignon, F., F.H.G. Ferreira and P.G. Leite (2002), “Beyond Oaxaca-Blinder: 
Accounting for Differences in Household Income Distributions across 
Countries”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2828. 
Deaton, A. (1997), The Analysis of Household Surveys, Baltimore, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Deininger, K. and L. Squire (1998), “New ways of looking at old issues: inequality 
and growth”, Journal of Development Economics, No. 57. 
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (2002a), 
Social Panorama of Latin America, 2000-2001 (LC/G.2138-P), Santiago, Chile, 
March. United Nations publication, Sales No. Sales No. E.01.II.G.141. 
   (2002b), Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 2001 
(LC/G.2151-P), Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.02.II.G.1. 
Forbes, K.J. (2000), “A reassessment of the relationship between inequality and 
growth”, American Economic Review, vol. 90, No. 4. 
Foster, J.E., J. Greer and E. Thorbecke (1984), “A class of decomposable poverty 
indices”, Econométrica, No. 52. 
Kakwani, N. C. (1980), Income Inequality and Poverty: Methods of Estimating and 
Policy Applications, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Psachoropoulos, G. (1994), “Returns to investment in education: a global update”, 
World Development , vol. 22, No. 9, September. 
48  ECLAC 
 
Robillard, A.S., F. Bourguignon and S. Robinson (2001), “Crisis and Income 
Distribution: A Micro-Macro Model for Indonesia”, Washington, D.C., 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
Sen, A.K. (1983), “Poor, relatively speaking”, Oxford Economic Papers, No. 35. 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2000), Overcoming Human 
Poverty, New York. 
United Nations (2001), “Road map towards the implementation of the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration. Report of the Secretary-General” 
(A/56/326), New York. 
   (2000), “United Nations Millenium Declaration. Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly” (A/RES/55/2), New York. 
World Bank (2001), Attacking Poverty: World Development Report, 2000/2001, 
New York, Oxford University Press. 
   (1990), World Development Report, New York, Oxford University Press. 
 





Meeting the Millennium Poverty Reduction Targets in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
51
A. Methodological appendix 
The decomposition exercises discussed in this analysis rely on 
simulations based on the construction of counterfactual income 
distributions. Whereas the macro scenarios described in section 2 are 
based on simple aggregate simulations, the micro scenarios discussed in 
section 3 required simulation at the level of the household data. Each of 
these procedures will be discussed here. 
1.  The macro scenarios 
The main purpose of this exercise is to shed light on the different 
combinations of growth in mean incomes and reduction in inequalities 
which would generate the required reduction in the incidence of extreme 
poverty. A measure of poverty Π in a given (cumulative) income 
distribution F(y) is always defined with respect to a poverty line z, which 
separates the poor from the non-poor. It is therefore always the case that 
poverty is a function of the distribution of income and of the poverty 
threshold: Π = Π(F(y), z). Since the Millennium poverty reduction targets 
were formulated in terms of the poverty incidence indicator P0, it actually 
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In order to consider how economic growth and changes in 
inequality might contribute to changes in the incidence of poverty P0, it is 
helpful to draw on the established result19 that: 
 












The above merely states that poverty incidence is completely 
determined by the poverty line, the mean of the distribution and its 
Lorenz Curve. 
This is useful for the analysis of reductions in extreme poverty, 
since it means that the effects of economic growth can be simulated as 
changes in mean income (μy) and the effects of inequality can be 
simulated as changes in the Lorenz Curve, L(p). In particular, there 
should exist (possibly a number of) hypothetical distribution(s) F*, with 
mean level μy* and Lorenz curve L*(p), which would have a poverty 
incidence of  




In particular, consider a counterfactual income distribution F*(y*), 
where: 
                                                          





























(1) y* = (1+β)[(1-α)y + αμy],      with 0 < α < 1 and β > 0 
 
This transformation corresponds to a distribution-neutral increase 
of β% in everyone's income level, coupled with a redistribution policy 
composed of taxing 100α% of everyone's income, and then distributing 
the revenues equally across every person in the population. 
It is easy to see that the mean of the resulting counterfactual 
distribution would be β% higher than in the original distribution: 
 
(2)   μy* = (1+β)μy 
 
It is also true that the Lorenz curve of the new distribution would 
be thus transformed: 
 
(3) L*(p) = (1-α)L(p) + αp 
 
and, consequently, that the Gini coefficient of the counterfactual 
distribution would be α% lower than the coefficient for the original 
distribution: 
 
(4) G*(y) = (1-α)G(y) 
 
The values of α and β can be chosen so that equations (2) and (3) 




P* can then be written as a function of the original income 
distribution, of the relevant poverty line and of the simulation parameters 
α and β: 
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Since α and β can be chosen independently, there is in fact a degree 
of freedom in the choice of simulation parameters. In other words, given a 
positive value of either α or β, there will exist a (positive or negative) 
value of the other parameter such that (5) holds. 
Box A.1 
PROOF OF EQUATION 4 
This last result can be proved as follows. It is known that the Gini 
coefficient is given by: 
 
 
It follows from (1) that: |yi* - yj*| = (1+β)(1-α)|yi - yj| 
 
Thus: ∑∑ |yi* - yj*| = (1+β)(1-α)∑∑|yi - yj|       
 
Dividing through by 2n2 (1+β)μy: 
 
(2n2μy*)-1 ∑∑ |yi* - yj*| = (2n2(1+β)μy)-1(1+β)(1-α)∑∑|yi - yj| 
which yields equation (4). 
 
Restricting the analysis to the combinations of positive values of α 
and β, for each country and poverty line (F(y) and z pair) in this report, 
consideration can be given to the set of (α, β)-pairs: 
 
(6)  I(F(y), z) = {( α, β) | P*(α, β, F(y), z) = P0/2; α, β > 0} 
 
This set I is the isopoverty set for the country with distribution F(y), 
with respect to poverty line z. Plotted on (α, β)-space, it was referred to in 
section 2 as the isopoverty curve. Any specific combination of a rate of 
inequality reduction (α) and a rate of economic growth (β) that belong to I 
will halve the incidence of poverty with respect to the extreme poverty 
line z in the relevant country. 
Three caveats about these simulations are worth noting. First, a 
reduction of α% in the Gini coefficient, as implied by equation (4), can 
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inequality. However, insofar as the alternative inequality measure 
satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom, the change it will record from 
the original distribution to a counterfactual Lorenz curve generated 
according to equation (3) will be a decline. 
Second, a reduction of α% in the Gini coefficient will translate into 
the new poverty incidence given by (5) only if the change in the Lorenz 
curve is exactly as given by equation (3). This is not inevitable, of course. 
There are many transformations which are different from (1) which are 
consistent with a fall of α% in the Gini coefficient. These transformations 
will not, in general, yield the predicted change in poverty incidence. This 
is because the incidence of poverty is determined by the poverty line, the 
mean income level and the entire Lorenz curve, not just the Gini 
coefficient. 
Third, the nature of this simulation exercise should be well 
understood. All that has been done is to lay out the various combinations 
of growth in mean incomes and proportional reductions in inequality 
which are statistically consistent with the desired reductions in extreme 
poverty for various countries. The analysis then focused on two of these 
combinations: one given by the extrapolation of trends from the 1990s 
over the next 15 years, and another that corresponds to a particular view 
of an “ideal” path. No attempt has been made to address the (crucial) 
issue of economic consistency between the calculated rates of growth and 
redistribution. It is clearly possible that some rates of redistribution 
―particularly if implemented through inefficient or coercive policies― 
might be inconsistent with incentives for agents to undertake the 
accumulation decisions required for the posited rates of economic growth. 
It is therefore important that this analysis should not be construed as 
being a set of policy simulations, because it is not. 
2.  The micro scenarios 
The second stage of the simulations, which has been discussed in 
section 3 above, goes a step further in the statistical decomposition of the 
economic changes required to achieve a target poverty rate P*. For two 
points on the isopoverty set defined for each country with respect to the 
extreme poverty line proposed for it by ECLAC (z2), this step breaks 
down the required changes in mean growth (β) and inequality (α) into five 
components. The two points considered are the intersections of the 
isopoverty set with the historical path and with the Maxiland path. The 
five components are: changes in the rate of occupation; changes in the 
average productivity of human capital (sometimes also referred to as the 
“average quality of jobs in the economy”); changes in the stock of human 
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capital; changes in mean income from public transfers; and changes in 
conditional wage inequality. 
The decomposition is based on a constructed identity. For each 




where yh denotes total household income; nh denotes the number of 
household members, of which nah are of working age (18-65). Of these, nth 
are actually gainfully employed. Let yth denotes total household income 
from labour; yah represents total household income from other (non-
human) assets; and yrh denotes total household income from public 
transfers. 
Multiplying out the terms in (7) while simplifying and taking 
averages across all households, the economy-wide aggregate analogue 




Let d = ∑nah/∑nh ; t = ∑nth/∑nah, ya denote the average asset 
income across households per adult (ya = ∑yah/∑nah) and yr denote the 
average transfer income across households per adult (yr = ∑yrh/∑nah). 
Then write that, for each individual worker i, labour income is related to 
education according to: 
 
 
where Si denotes the number of years of schooling completed by 
individual i. From the data, compute h = Ei(Exp [0.1Si + εi]), which has 
been defined here as the average stock of human capital. It then becomes 
























































































(8) can now be rewritten as: 
 
(8')  μ(y) = d[tqh + ya + yr], 
 
which is constructed as an identity and involves no econometric 
estimation. Note that each variable has a specific economic interpretation: 
d, which is the number of adults over the total population, is the inverse 
of the dependency ratio; t, which is the proportion of employed adults, is 
the occupation rate; q, defined as above, is the average productivity of 
human capital, or a measure of the average “quality” of worker-job 
matches in the economy; h is an approximate measure of the stock of 
human capital in the economy, relying on the Psacharopoulos, G. (1994) 
estimated international average for returns to education of 10%; ya is 
average income from assets; and yr is average transfer income. 
It follows that the aggregate economic growth simulated in the 
macro scenarios as (1+β)μ can be obtained through various different 
combinations of changes in the ratios on the right-hand side of the above 
identity. In particular, if the choice is made to keep the dependency ratio 




Changes in each individual δ parameter are simulated straight-
forwardly, except for δh, which corresponds to changes in the stock of 
human capital, and hence in the entire distribution of years of schooling 
over the population. The required mean value for h could be obtained 
from an infinite number of different transformations of the observed 
distribution of years of schooling, G(E). To avoid ambiguity, in every case 
the researchers chose to simulate the required counterfactual distribution 
of education as a convex combination of the observed distribution and of 
a “target” distribution of years of schooling T(E), which was postulated 
for Maxiland as: G* = kG(E) + (1-k)T(E), where k is determined so as to 
scale h up by a factor (1 + δh). The procedure is illustrated graphically 
below (see figure A.1): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]rrahqt yyhqtdy δδδδµβ ++++++=+ 11111
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Figure A.1 














Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
The counterfactual income distribution simulated in this step has 
required changes in the levels of education, in the occupation rate and in 
some income sources at the household and individual levels. The 
aggregate inequality level for the ensuing counterfactual distribution is 
clearly not guaranteed to be identical to the one which is generated at the 
aggregate (macro) level by equation (4): G*(y) = (1-α)G(y). To ensure 
consistency across the macro- and micro-simulations, then, a final 
adjustment is required. This is carried out by scaling up or down, as 
needed, the variance of the residuals εi in the individual earnings 




Once this adjustment has been made, while ensuring that the δ 
vector is consistent with the macro growth simulation parameter β and 
that the inequality in the counterfactual distribution arising from the 
micro-simulation is consistent with the macro inequality simulation 
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B. Statistical appendix 
The analysis presented in this report has drawn primarily on unit-
record, household data from the following household surveys, which 
were conducted by national statistical agencies in each country. The 
survey names, coverage and sample size are listed in table B.1 below. The 
table also contains the name of each country’s currency and the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate applied to each. 
Table B.1 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS AND EXCHANGE RATES 











Argentina Encuesta Permanente 
de Hogares 






Bolivia Encuesta Continua de 
Hogares 
November 1999 National 3 035 
households 
Bolivianos 0.427 
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra de Domicílios 
September 
1999 






November 1998 National 48 107 
households 
Peso 0.004 









Encuesta de Hogares 
de Propósitos 
Múltiples 
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Table B.1 (concluded) 













Encuesta Nacional de 




National 4 810 
households 
Peso 0.195 
Ecuador Encuesta de 
Condiciones de Vida 
October 1998–
September 1999 





Encuesta de Hogares 
de Propósitos Múltiples 
1999 National 16 164 
households 
Colón 0.188 
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional de 




National 7 139 
households 
Quetzal 0.415 
Honduras Encuesta Permanente 
de Hogares 
March 1999 National 6 611 
households 
Lempira 0.204 
Mexico Encuesta Nacional de 
Ingresos y Gastos de 
los Hogares (ENIGH) 
July–September
2000 
National 10 108 
households 
Peso 0.157 
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares sobre 




National 4 209 
households 
Córdoba 0.463 
Panama Encuesta de Hogares August 1999 National 10 229 
households 
Balboa 2.414 




National 5 101 
households 
Guaraní 0.0008 
Peru Encuesta Nacional de 
Niveles de Vida 
2000 National 3 995 
households 
Sol 0.663 











National 16 127 
households 
Bolívar 0.0023 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from household surveys of the respective countries. 
Two sets of adjustments were made to the data set from each of 
these surveys. First, all households with zero per capita incomes were 
excluded from the sample. Second, all of the ECLAC adjustments were 
used to correct for under-reporting. Adjustments such as these are 
suggested by ECLAC for most household surveys in Latin America and 
the Caribbean and are designed to bring broad aggregates implied by the 
surveys into line with the orders of magnitude estimated for the same 
aggregates from national accounts. Adjustments differ across countries, as 
needs differ from survey to survey. In general, the most common 
adjustments involve: (i) some correction for under-reporting of transfer 
incomes, often implemented by scaling up this income source for all 
recipient units so as to generate aggregates compatible with public 
disbursement data; (ii) a similar correction for under-reporting of capital 
incomes, implemented by scaling up such incomes reported by the top 
fifth of the household income per capita distribution (by individuals); and 
(iii) upward corrections in reported incomes for household that own their 
own dwellings (in lieu of imputed rent). See ECLAC (2001) for more 
detailed information on this subject. 
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Finally, since this report is part of an international research project 
and it is therefore important to facilitate cross-country comparisons, 
results are presented for all countries in 1999 United States dollars. The 
countries’ currencies were converted to 1999 United States dollars using 
the 1993 CPI-based PPP exchange rates published by the World Bank. 
Since these rates are available only up to 1993, CPI inflation rates in 
national currencies and in the United States dollar were both taken into 
account. This was done by multiplying the national currencies by the 




where c denotes the country and t denotes the (central) reference month 
(and year) of the survey. The right-hand side (RHS) term 1 is the inverse 
of the national CPI (urban and rural; base June 1993 = 1) for period t; RHS 
term 2 is the original 1993 CPI-based PPP exchange rate for country c; 
RHS term 3 is the United States CPI, with a base of June 1993. This is 1.15 
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Figure B.1 

























Source: For figures B1 and B2: authors’ calculations based on the data from household surveys of the 
respective countries. 
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Source: For figures B3 and B4: authors’ calculations based on the data from household surveys of the 
respective countries. 
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Figure B.5 
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Figure B.9 
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Figure B.13 
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Figure B.17 
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